In particular, I focus on questions about which processes of moral inquiry  are capable of justifying agents' objections to the social practices and policies found both within the societies in which they are living and within the societies of which they are not members.

 

In my dissertation, I argue that agents' responsiveness to the claims others raise in public discourse – and, particularly, responsiveness to the claims of those who are most negatively impacted by the social practices in question – is a crucial part of what justifies agents' moral evaluations of social practices. I further claim that members of marginalized social groups often face significant social pressures to be responsive to the worldviews of politically privileged social groups and that this additional responsiveness within discourse is capable of explaining the kinds of epistemic advantages that are so often present in the standpoints of oppressed members of society. Moreover, I analyze – and seek to improve – the ways that agents go about familiarizing themselves with a variety of different worldviews. To do so, I draw upon the strategies developed by agents living at the intersection of multiple oppressions who have been particularly successful at bringing different worldviews into critical interaction with one another.

 

I am also currently working on projects that extend this model of moral justification to the social practices and policies of scientific communities. In doing so, I wish to emphasize the importance of taking seriously the dissenting opinions of those members of scientific communities who belong to marginalized social groups.